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In this day of increasing public concern with high inflation rates, low pro-
ductivity gains, and a growing maze of environmental, health, and safety reg-
ulation, policymakers are beginning to examine the effects of this "social" reg-
ulation on technological advance. The Executive Branch has completed its
Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation and Congress, through its
Office of Technology Assessment, is pursuing a similar study of the effect of
regulation on technology. These studies confirm the conclusion of an earlier
National Science Foundation sponsored literature search on the same subject
that
: . . our knowledge of the effects of regulation on technological innovation is
indeed limited. We discovered no theoretical treatments and the empirical lit-
erature is limited to a few studies of the impact on pharmaceutical innovation
of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.I
Hypotheses about the effects of various forms of social regulation on
technological advance are loosely stated, rarely derived from any analytical
models of the firm's research and development (R&D) decision process, and
seldom supported by empirical evidence. William M. Capron concludes that
the effects of traditional industry-management regulation on innovation also
apply to social regulation:
* . . a priori expectations cannot easily be tested against the record because (1)
regulation is only one of many factors that account for the actual course of
technological change in these industries; (2) the industries themselves differ in
significant respects; and (3) the actual record of technological change in any
* This paper was originally presented, in a slightly different form, at the Conference on Regu-
lation and Innovation sponsored by the Center for the Study of Business Regulation at Duke
University, Durham, N.C., on May 9, 1979.
t The author would like to thank Paul B. Downing, Roger C. Noll, Bruce M. Owen, and V.
Kerry Smith for their helpful suggestions on the first draft of this paper.
** Associate Professor of Business Administration, and Director of the Center for the Study of
Business Regulation, Duke University.
1. C. HILL, A STATE OF THE ART REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION IN THE CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES 'CAPI Project* 2 (Center for
Dev. Technology, Washington Univ., Feb. 1975).
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industry does not, in and of itself, indicate what changes could or would have
taken place without regulation.
2
This paper will focus on one subset of the problems described above,
namely, how do the various types of environmental regulation which are pro-
posed in the literature and employed in practice affect the rate and kinds (of-
ten called direction or bias) of innovation produced by firms, where by inno-
vation we shall include both the invention of new technology and its first
commercial use (only the latter activity is sometimes referred to as innova-
tion).3 Although the full impact of technological advance will not occur until it
has moved through the diffusion stage, we will have less to say about this lat-
ter stage.
Many economists recognize that the effects of environmental regulation on
technological advance may well be more important than the static efficiency
effects. For example, Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultze argue that,
"[O]ver the long haul, perhaps the most important single criterion on which
to judge environmental policies is the extent to which they spur new technol-
ogy toward the efficient conservation of environmental quality."4 Given the
importance of the problem, the literature contains surprisingly few analytical
models. A recent paper by this author 5 on the effects of effluent standards
and charges on innovation will serve as the basis for many of the hypotheses
proposed in this paper. Earlier works consist of V. Kerry Smith's model
demonstrating that an effluent charge may alter the path of innovations cho-
sen by a firm, 6 Richard 0. Zerbe's graphical model of the effects of effluent
charges, subsidies, and standards on innovation,7 and Adam Gifford, Jr.'s
model of the effect of effluent charges on growth.' In addition, Roger A.
McCain has recently verified one of the conclusions in the author's earlier
paper.9
Section II of this paper explains the qualifications and assumptions which
limit the focus of this effort, while Section III describes the five types of envi-
ronmental regulation to be modelled and provides examples of each type.
Sections IV through VIII model each of the five types of environmental regu-
2. Capron, Introduction to TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 3 (W. Capron
ed., Brookings Inst. 1971).
3. See J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMlIC DEVELOPMENT 65-74 (1934).
4. A. KNEESE AND C. SCHULTZE, I'OLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLIcY 82 (Brookings Inst.
1975).
5. Magat, Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model of the Firm, 5 J. ENViR.
ECON. MANAGEMENT 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Magat].
6. Smith, The Implications of Common Property Resources for Technical Change, 3 EUR. ECON. REV.
469-79 (1972).
7. Zerbe, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control, 8 W. ECON. J. 364-76 (1970).
8. Gifford, Pollution, Technology, and Economic Growth, 40 S. ECON. J. 210-15 (1973).
9. McCain, Endogenous Bias in Technical Progress and Environmental Policy, 68 AM. ECON. REv.
538-46 (1978).
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lation and generate hypotheses about their effects on innovation. The five
types of regulation are: effluent charges, non-technology-based effluent stan-
dards, marketable permits, technology-based effluent standards, and subsidies
for abatement capital. Finally, Section IX summarizes the major findings.
I
QUALIFICATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Besides environmental regulation, there are many other factors which in-
fluence the rate and direction of technological advance chosen by a firm. In
making comparisons of the effects of the five types of regulation on innova-
tion, we will assume that the levels of these other factors remain constant.
Where we suspect the comparison between different environmental regula-
tions would be affected by the level of other factors, we will qualify our con-
clusions. The effects of these other factors on innovation provides an even
longer list of hypotheses about technological advance, many of which are con-
tained in Roger G. Noll's summary article. 10 The other factors include: the
extent of market competition; the opportunities available for technological
progress; wage and rental rates; product prices; the extent to which inven-
tions are supplied by non-profit institutions, such as the government; the
appropriability of new ideas; the expectations of each firm concerning the
likelihood of innovation in the industry; and uncertainty due to the lack of
enforcement of and changes in environmental regulations.
Uncertainty, we assume, can arise from three sources: uncertainty due to
the stochastic nature of the R&D process, uncertainty due to lack of perfect
enforcement of regulations," and uncertainty due to changes in future values
of the regulatory parameters (e.g., taxes and standards). We assume either
that firms face no uncertainty from these three sources or that their decisions
are based on the expected values of the outcomes from R&D spending, of en-
forcement, and of future regulatory parameters, and that uncertainty does
not affect their decisions. This represents a strong assumption and one area
in which the results of this paper could be studied further.
Some authors have objected strenuously to the induced innovation model
which we employ precisely because it does not describe how any particular firm
deals with uncertainty inherent in the R&D process. This represents a legiti-
mate criticism of the induced innovation model for predicting the innovation-
producing behavior of individual firms, but the criticism is not applicable to
10. R. Noll. Government Policy and Technological Innovation: Where Do We Stand and
Where Do We Go- (unpublished paper, Cal. Inst. of Technology Social Science Working Paper
No. 86 May 1975).
11. To assume perfect enforcement of any environmental regulation is indeed an heroic as-
sumption, as Paul B. Downing and James Kimball have so vividly explained in Enforcing Admin-
istrative Rules (unpublished paper. Nat'l. Btureau of Economic Research, Proceedings of Confer-
ence on Public Regulation of December 15, 1977).
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use of the model for making public policy recommendations that apply to nu-
merous firms. As long as the model predicts the behavior of firms, on average,
it is useful for public policy purposes, even if it does not describe accurately
the behavior of any particular firm. For example, the Nelson-Winter model
of evolutionary behavior is more descriptively accurate, but suggests average
behavior that is not very different from that predicted by the induced innova-
tion model. Hans Binswanger 2 suggests this conclusion by extracting the fol-
lowing quote from Nelson and Winter concerning their evolutionary model
that is consistent with a major prediction from induced innovation literature:
S.. a higher wage rate nudges firms to move in a capital intensive direction
compared with that in which they would have gone. Also, the effect of a
higher wage rate is to make all technologies less profitable (assuming, as in
our model, a constant cost of capital) but the cost increase is proportionately
greatest for those that involve a low capital-labour ratio.13
In addition, we assume that no single firm can influence either the type of
environmental regulation imposed upon it or the levels of the regulatory pa-
rameters. If a firm can negotiate the level of its environmental regulation
(e.g., the stringency of a standard), then these parameters can no longer be
assumed to be fixed and our analysis would have to be significantly altered.
This assumption is most reasonable in cases involving large numbers of pol-
luting firms. For our analysis the assumption becomes crucial to our defini-
tion of an effluent charge which is "equivalent" to a given effluent discharge
standard. Since most effluent charge schemes proposed for air or water pollu-
tion problems have not been firn-specific, the equivalency we define will be
between a given total effluent discharge standard for all polluting firms in a
region and a charge which induces all firms to meet that total discharge limit.
Thus, no single firm's decisions affect significantly this equivalence. We usu-
ally will not consider the effects of each type of regulation on ancillary indus-
tries (i.e., pollution control equipment and toxicological testing), although
these do constitute important questions.
II
TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
In Ronald Coase's delightful and now familiar article, The Problem of Social
Cost, 4 he argues that the inefficiency created by externalities can be elimi-
nated if private negotiations between all concerned parties can be arranged.
One must always respond to this attack on the need for any form of govern-
12. Binswanger, Induced Technical Change: Evolution of Thought, in BINSWANGER, RUTTAN, ET AL.,
INDUCED INNOVATION 13, 29-32 (1978).
13. Nelson and Winter, Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and
Prospectus, 84 ECON. J. 886, 900 (1974).
14. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw EcoN. 1-44 (1960).
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ment regulation when writing about environmental regulation. We will adopt
the assumption that information and transactions costs make private negotia-
tions between polluters and pollution victims an infeasible solution to the en-
vironmental problems with which we are concerned (e.g., urban air pollution,
river pollution, and lake pollution).
Given the diversity of regulatory approaches available to attack environ-
mental problems, it is unreasonable to assume that they all affect firms'
technological development decisions in the same manner. Although it is un-
reasonable to ask whether "regulation" affects innovation, it is reasonable to
ask what the differences are in the effects of various types of environmental
regulation on a firm's rate of technological advance and the mix of improve-
ment between pollution abatement technology and output production technol-
ogy. From a public policy perspective, this last set of comparisons is important
because each kind of pollution usually employs only one type of regulation.
We will consider five types of environmental regulation that directly affect
the production decisions of firms. One approach is to impose effluent
charges, often called fees or taxes, on polluting firms. 15 Although favored by
many economists, the only use of this approach in air and water policy occurs
in waste surcharges required of industrial water polluters discharging into
municipal sewer systems under the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
merits (WPCAA). 16 A second approach is to use non-technology-based efflu-
ent standards to reduce effluent discharges, standards determined by trading
off costs and benefits, by cost-effectiveness analysis, or by some other criteria
not solely based on technological feasibility.17 Compliance could be achieved
either by fines or by compliance fees. The air pollution effluent standards, set
by states to comply with the ambient air quality standards mandated by the
1970 Clean Air Act (CAA), 18 are one example. A third approach, also based
on providing economic incentives, is to create a market for pollution per-
mits.' 9 The EPA's offset policy for air polluters in non-attainment areas rep-
resents one such example.20 Under this policy, firms which desire to start or
expand production in a region not meeting the national ambient air quality
standards are allowed to pay other firms in the region to make offsetting pol-
lution reductions. A fourth approach is to impose technology-based effluent
standards on polluting firms, standards with levels determined solely by the
15. See A. KNEESE AND B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, T ECHNOLOGY, IN-
STITUTIONS 141-42 (Resources for the Future, Inc. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KNEESE AND
BOWER].
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816, 144-77 (1972).
17. See KNEESE AND BOWER, supra note 15, at 135-38.
18. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-83 (1970).
19. J DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 93-100 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DALES].
20. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 715, 717-19 (1977).
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limits of current or available technology. 2 ' Again, compliance could be
achieved by fines or by compliance fees. Examples include the "best practica-
ble technology" (BPT) and "best available technology" (BAT) industrial water
pollution standards2 2 and new source performance standards for industrial air
pollution.2 3 The fifth approach involves providing subsidies for firms and
municipalities to use abatement capital. 24 Tax-exempt financing for industrial
pollution abatement,2 5 rapid amortization of pollution control equipment,
26
and the 75 percent federal subsidies of municipal waste treatment plant capi-
tal expenditures (under WPCAA) represent examples of this approach.
We will not study environmental regulations which restrict the composi-
tion, use, and characteristics of the final product, such as a ban on the use of
phosphates in detergents, pesticide use restrictions, and automobile emission
standards.
III
EFFLUENT CHARGES AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In this and the four subsequent Sections we will present two types of re-
sults about the effects on innovation of the five types of environmental regu-
lation. Results called theorems are derived logically from models of firm be-
havior under the particular regulatory regime. Results called propositions
come from careful reasoning about the effects of regulation, but they are not
supported by an explicit model of firm behavior.
A. The Model27
In order to focus on the problem of technological change, we employ a
simple model of production in which a firm employs one variable input (at
rate L), to produce its output (at rate y), and a pollutant (at discharge rate x).
This represents a simplification of most firms' production processes, since
they' typically employ a variety of inputs while producing multiple outputs
and more than one pollutant. Nonetheless, we are interested in the effects of
21. A. Freeman, Technology-Based Effluent Standards: The U.S. Case (unpublished paper
on file with the Environment and Indus. Div. of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Dev. 1976).
22. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, supra note 16.
23. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, supra note 18.
24. See Renshaw, Should the Federal Government Subsidize Industrial Pollution Control Investments?
I J. ENVT'L. EcoN, MANAGEMENT 84-88 (1974).
25. Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat. 251, 267
(1968).
26. 26 U.S.C. § 169 (1976).
27. For a more detailed explanation of the model, see Magat, supra note 5, at 3-7. For a
discussion of Kamien and Schwartz's model of factor-augmenting technological change, see In-
duced Factor Augmenting Technical Progress from a Microeconomic Viewpoint, 37 EcONoIETRICA 668-84
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Kamien and Schwartz].
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regulation on pollution abatement technology innovation and output technol-
ogy innovation and we can safely suppress the firm's choice among various
factors of production, outputs, and pollutants. Technical change occurs
through product augmentation, where Ay and Bx represent the effective out-
put rate and the effective effluent discharge rate. The augmentation parame-
ters, A and B, are positive scalars respectively measuring the levels of the out-
put production and effluent abatement components of the technology. This
joint production relation is summarized by the production function,
L = g(Ay,Bx). We assume that employing more of the input, L, either raises
the output rate, y, lowers the pollution rate, x, or some combination of these
two effects. Note that improvements in output production technology are rep-
resented by a decrease in A, whereas improvements in the effluent abatement
technology are represented by an increase in B. Appendix A provides a more
detailed description of the production function.
We see technological advance occurring through expenditures, M, by a
firm that produces a combination of output technology innovation and efflu-
ent abatement technology innovation. The parameter, /3, measures the alloca-
tion of effective R&D effort between the two types of technological advance.
We assume that for a given expenditure, M, on R&D, the tradeoff between
output technology innovation, A/A, and abatement technology innovation,
13/B, occurs along a smooth innovation-possibilities frontier, such as the one
given in Figure 1.28 Increases in R&D spending, M, shift out the frontier. We
shall call M the rate of technological advance, while /3 measures the bias or di-
rection of technical change. Appendix A provides a more detailed description
of the model of technological advance.
Again, as with the model of production, this technological advance model
is a simplification of the manner in which technological change actually oc-
curs. We addressed this issue in Section I, but a further explanation is
needed. Individual advances tend to be awkward, incorporating discrete
changes in both the output production and effluent abatement technologies.
In the aggregate, or on-average, environmental regulations do bias R&D ef-
fort towards abatement technology innovation and they do affect the rate of
R&D spending in a systematic manner. It is not necessary that the model be
descriptively accurate for any particular firm, as long as, on-average, firms behave
according to the model. There is good evidence to support the predictive ac-
curacy of the induced innovation model. 29
28. A and A stand for the derivatives of A and B with respect to time, so that AlA and B/B
measure the proportional time rates of change of the output production and effluent abatement
technologies, respectively.
29. Binswanger, supra note 12.







FIG. 1. Innovation-Possibilities Frontier
The proofs of the theorems which follow require the use of these models
of production and technological advance; however, the details of the models
are not necessary to an understanding of the theorems themselves and their
implications.
B. The Results
Let us first consider how imposing an effluent charge, T, on each unit of
pollution discharged by the firm would affect the bias in its technical advance.
Assume that the firm's output can be sold at the competitive price p.
Theorem 1: An effluent charge causes the firm to bias its technological ad-
vance towards abatement technology innovation. 30
Appendix B contains the proof of the theorem. The proof is based on the
observation that without an effluent charge, a firm seeks to maximize the rate
of output technology growth, A/A. In Figure 1 this direction of technical ad-
vance is represented by the point)3 =0, where the innovation-possibilities fron-
tier crosses the A/A axis. Generally, maximization of the rate of output tech-
nology growth could occur in either the southeast or southwest quadrants. In
these cases the maximum occurs in technology which is becoming either less
or more polluting, respectively. When faced with a positive effluent charge,
the firm possesses an incentive to reduce its total effluent charge bill. One
30. To be more exact, we must qualify all of our theorems to indicate that they hold under
the assumptions of the model of the firm in Section III A and under the additional assumption
that the firm selects its rates of output and effluent discharge and its rate and bias in technical
advance to maximize the rate of increase of net profits.
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way is to develop a less-polluting technology, so it moves from the flat point
on its innovation-possibilities frontier to a positively-sloping point where its
abatement technology is advancing more rapidly. Thus, imposing an effluent
charge induces the firm to shift some of its effective R&D effort from output
technology improvement to effluent abatement technology improvement.
Theorem 2: An effluent charge can cause the firm either to reduce or increase
its R&D expenditure rate.
If the effect of the reduced output rate and the bias away from output
technology improvement outweigh the effect of a positive charge, then the
R&D expenditure rate M would decline. Otherwise it would increase. The ex-
act effect depends upon the specific characteristics of a firm's production
function and the shape of its innovation-possibilities frontier (see the proof in
Appendix C). We cannot conclude that, in general, effluent charges lower a
firm's expenditure on R&D.
Theorem 3: If without an effluent charge a firm devotes no R&D effort to
abatement technology improvement, then an effluent charge will induce it to
invest in abatement technology innovation.
Appendix D provides the proof of Theorem 3, which follows from Theo-
rems 1 and 2. Note that if a firm's innovation-possibilities curve flattens out
inside the southeast quadrant (i.e., the rate of output technology innovation is
maximized by devoting some R&D effort to abatement technology innova-
tion), then some positive amount of abatement technology innovation would
occur without an effluent charge. From Theorem 2 the R&D rate could con-
ceivably decrease after imposing an effluent charge. If this reduction in the
R&D rate is significant enough, it could outweigh the effect of directing
more of the firm's R&D effort towards abatement technology innovation.
Thus, it is possible, although highly unlikely, that imposing an effluent charge
could reduce a firm's rate of abatement technology innovation.
Theorem 4: Imposing an effluent charge is likely to reduce a firm's rate of out-
put technology innovation, but it need not have this effect.
Appendix E contains the proof. The unlikely event of an increase in out-
put technology innovation could occur only if the effluent charge induced the
firm to spend so much more on R&D that at this higher expenditure level the
now smaller share directed toward output technology improvement was larger
than the original effort devoted to output technology innovation. We have
confirmed the usual working hypothesis that an effluent charge is likely to re-
duce a firm's output productivity growth rate. Precisely because firms tend to
trade-off output technology advance for more abatement technology advance,
many policy-makers are concerned about implementing effluent charges in
particular and environmental regulations in general.




STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
As an alternative to the effluent charge approach, the government can set
an effluent discharge standard, R. A firm then seeks to maximize its profits
(the difference between total revenue and the cost of the variable input) sub-
ject to the constraint that its effluent discharge rate not exceed the standard.
From equations (10a), (10b), (30a) and (30b) of Magat, we recognize that with
an effluent charge equal to the Lagrange multiplier for the constrained prob-
lem, the first-order conditions for the solution to this problem under a
standard are equivalent to those conditions which characterize the profit-
maximizing output and effluent discharge decisions under an effluent charge.
By setting the level of the effluent charge equal to the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier, the same production decisions can be induced.3i More-
over, the rate and direction of' technical advance selected tinder an effluent
standard will be exactly those chosen under an equivalent effluent charge,
implying that the effects of imposing an effluent standard on a previously
unregulated firm will be the same effects described under Theorems I
through 4 for the equivalent effluent charge. In Summary,
Theorem 5: An effluent standard induces the firm to bias its technological ad-
vance towards abatement technology innovation, while the firm's R&D ex-
penditure rate may either decrease or increase. If, without an effluent
standard, the firm devotes no R&D effort to abatement technology improve-
ment, then an effluent standard will cause it to invest in abatement technology
innovation. Imposing an effluent standard is likely to reduce a firm's rate of
output technology innovation, but it need not have this effect for all firms.3 2
Having compared the firm's rate and direction of technical advance under
an effluent standard with that under no regulation, let us examine in detail
31. This assumes, of course, that the second-order conditions for profit maximization are
satisfied. Some authors have criticized the effluent charge approach because the externalities
themselves can create non-convexities which might lead a firm to non-optimal output level and
effluent decisions. Certainly to the extent that this problem leads tn static inefficiency through tihe
use of the charges policy, it would also make much less clear the equivalence between charges
and standards described in this section. See Starrett, Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theoy of Ex-
ternalities, 4J. EcoN. THEORY 180-99 (1972).
32. Having discovered that imposing an effluent standard induces the firm to shift its direc-
tion of technical change towards more abatement technology innovation, a natural further ques-
tion is whether lowering the level of the standard (i.e., increasing its stringency) causes the bias to
shift towards even more abatement technology innovation. In one special but important case, the
answer is surprisingly no. When substitution of* labor between output production and effluent
abatement is difficult (formally, when the elasticity of transformation defined in Magat, supra
note 5, at 6-7, is less than one) and when the elasticity of the returns to scale function, (h is con-
stant, then no matter what the level of the standard the bias, 0, converges to the same steady-
state value. For a proof of this result see id. at 19, Theorem 8.
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the comparison between the rate and direction of technical advance under an
effluent standard and under an effluent charge.
With perfect information about the marginal costs of abatement, an efflu-
ent charge can usually be found which induces the same level of abatement as
any given standard. However, over time technological advance causes the
marginal abatement cost function to shift so that the effluent charge would
have to change in order to induce the same level of abatement. In practice it
would be extremely difficult for a regulator to maintain this equivalence of ef-
fluent charges and standards over time, for the regulator would have to an-
nounce a time-varying schedule of effluent charges that anticipates the effect
of abatement technology advance on the firm's marginal abatement cost func-
tion. In a world in which administrative costs and lack of information make
determining even the correct initial level of the charge a difficult task, it
would be highly unlikely to find regulators willing or able to announce a
time-varying schedule of effluent charges which are equivalent to a fixed ef-
fluent standard.
3 3
A more workable alternative is to set an effluent charge at a level which is
initially equivalent to the standard, but thereafter the rates of effluent dis-
charge, output, abatement technology advance and output technology ad-
vance would diverge. Another alternative is to adjust periodically the level of
the charge to induce the firm to stay "close" to meeting the level of the fixed
effluent standard. The analysis summarized in Table I of Magat34 indicates
that, in general, we cannot determine which temporally constant policy will
yield the greatest increases in abatement and output technology advance.
In the special case in which only abatement technology advances (and not
output technology), Richard 0. Zerbe has shown that afixed charge provides a
greater incentive for abatement technology advance than a fixed standard.35 Let
us consider his argument based on his Figure 1, reproduced as our Figure 2.
In Zerbe's example the firm originally possesses the marginal cost of abate-
ment curve MC and faces the effluent standard qx, or the equivalent effluent
charge T1 . After a technological advance, the marginal abatement cost curve
drops to MQ (to simplify the example he assumes no output technology im-
provement). The cost-saving incentive from innovation, given the standard, is
acdb, while the cost-saving incentive under the charge is acdb, plus ced, assum-
ing that the charge remains fixed at T.
It might be realistic to assume that the level of the charge would not adjust
in the short run, but after the abatement technology advance charge T1 can
no longer be considered equivalent to the standard qx, for under the charge
33. For a discussion of an iterative approach to setting charges see Baumol, On Taxation and the
Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 307-22 (1972).
34. Magat, supra note 5, at 21.
35. Zerbe, supra note 7, at 371-75.
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FIG. 2. The equivalence between emission charges and standards.
1 less waste (sx) is discharged by the firm. Even though Zerbe's example
demonstrates that the fixed charge T creates a stronger incentive to innovate
than thefixed standard qx, to claim that the two regulatory policies are equiv-
alent remains troublesome.
We believe that the only reasonable definition of "equivalent" effluent
charge and standard policies requires that the charge induce the same level of
effluent discharge as the standard over the entire period of analysis.
We will now analyze a model which does compare the rates of abatement
and output technology advance for two policies which meet the above defini-
tion of equivalency. We do not claim that the model accurately describes all
situations under which two equivalent policies can be applied; however, it
does demonstrate how simple the model must be before any comparison can
be made of equivalent policies.
Specifically, let us consider the case of an urban air pollution problem in
which many firms discharge pollution. In this large-numbers case it is reason-
able to assume that adjustments in the charge (necessitated by abatement tech-
nology advances by all firms) would not result directly from the actions of any
single firm, or at least that no one firm would expect any significant adjust-
ment in the charge to all firms because of its abatement technology advance.
In practice the regulator would have to announce in advance a time-varying
schedule of charges based on his expectation of how all firms would react to
the charge through investing in abatement technology improvement.
In the context of Zerbe's example, abatement technology advance causes
the equivalent charge to fall to T2 (see Figure 2) and the firm will enjoy the
tax reduction cghd automatically. As long as the firm does not recognize that
its abatement technology innovation causes the effluent charge reduction (i.e.,
there are many polluters), it calculates a cost-reduction from innovation of
acdb, exactly the same incentive provided by the equivalent standard.
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A more general example would allow for output technology innovation, in
which case output rises and total wastes would rise for most firms.3 6 This
would extend the right boundary of Figure 2 and under a temporally-con-
stant effluent standard the quantity of waste controlled would move to the
right of oq, implying that the new equivalent charge would be above T2 . The-
orem 7 of Magat indicates that for most firms the equivalent tax would actu-
ally increase above T,. As long as the firm does not recognize that it causes this
change in the charge level, the incentive to innovate under the two policies is
equal.
In the context of the model of Section A the same result holds due to
equivalence of the first-order conditions for the two problems. 3 7 We will re-
cord this result as a theorem.
Theorem 6: Under the Section A model and the assumption that firms do not
expect their technological advance to cause an adjustment in the level of the
effluent charge, the identical rate and direction of technical advance are in-
duced by an effluent standard as are induced by the equivalent effluent
charge.
As long as an effluent charge is set at a level that induces an effluent dis-
charge level which exactly meets a standard, the two policies will have the
same effect on a firm's R&D investment decisions. By comparing first-order
conditions for a firm operating under the two regulatory policies, the proper
equivalence between effluent standards and effluent charges is clear. The re-
sult that the two equivalent policies yield the same rate and direction of tech-
nical advance follows easily. However, most economists have missed the impli-
cations of this equivalence for technological advance, or they have been
considering the case of a small number of polluters or two policies which are
not equivalent dynamically. It is fair to say that their working hypothesis is
that effluent charges produce a stronger incentive for abatement technology
advance than do effluent standards.
Theorems 5 and 6 imply that the likely reduction in the firm's rate of out-
put technology innovation under an effluent standard will be equivalent to
that under the comparable effluent charge.
Before leaving the subject of the incentives to innovate under an effluent
standard, it is useful to consider the effect of different enforcement mecha-
nisms. We have been assuming implicitly that the firm is either shut clown if it
discharges pollution at a rate greater than the standard or that it faces an infi-
nite fine for violating the standard. The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act mandate the use of compliance fees after mid-1979, so we will consider
36. See Theorems 1, 2, and 3 in Magat, supra note 5, at 9-11.
37. See Section IV, paragraph one.
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how this enforcement policy would affect the conclusions of this Section.
Examination of Figure 2 again shows that as long as the compliance fee (per
unit of effluent, FI) exceeds the level of the charge equivalent to the standard
(T1 ), the firm will discharge only qx units of waste. The cost-saving incentive
from innovation is acdb, as under the effluent standard policy (with perfect
enforcement) and under the equivalent effluent charge policy.
V
MARKETABLE PERMITS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The EPA's recent offset policy for limiting air pollution in cities which
have failed to meet national ambient air quality standards has renewed inter-
est in the marketable permits policy first popularized by John H. Dales in
1968.38 A public agency would provide a market for the exchange of air pol-
lution permits and police the actions of polluters to insure that they were not
using more than their purchased share of permits. As part of its duties in
operating the market, the agency would: determine how many permits to sell,
sell the initial offering of permits, and then act as a central exchange for the
transfer of permits.
From the firm's point of view, the price that it must pay for air permits is
equivalent to paying an effluent charge on its effluent discharge, so the impo-
sition of an air permits market would affect the firm's innovation decisions in
the same way as imposing a charge at the level of the market clearing price.
Formally,
Theorem 7: Imposing a pollution permits market on the area in which a firm
operated would cause it to bias its technical advance towards abatement tech-
nology innovation, while its R&D expenditure rate may either decrease or in-
crease. If, without a pollution permits market, the firm devotes no R&D ef-
fort to abatement technology improvement, then the pollution permits market
will cause it to invest in abatement technology innovation. Imposing the pollu-
tion permits market is likely to reduce the firm's rate of output technology in-




A. Abatement Technology Innovation
The reliance upon technology-based effluent standards to protect water
quality was the most significant aspect of the 1972 Water Pollution Control
38. DALES, supra note 19.
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Act Amendments. By 1977 all industrial, point-source polluters were to meet
the so-called "best practicable control technology currently available" (BPT)
standards, which were to be based upon engineering analysis of the available
control technologies. By 1983 they must comply with standards based on the
"best available technology economically achievable" (BAT). EPA also set
technology-based standards for new sources of both water and air pollution,
so this regulatory approach has become a central part of the agency's control
strategy.
Most technology-based effluent standards are written into discharge per-
mits as the levels of effluent discharge consistent with the specified technology.
Legally a firm may adopt another technology and still avoid a fine if the
alternative technology meets the effluent standards. However, in practice a
firm is much less likely to be fined if it fails to meet the standards but adopts
the specified technology than if it fails to meet the standard and has adopted
what it considers to be a less-polluting technology. For practical purposes,
standards, such as the BPT standards, require the use of a specified technol-
ogy, and they discourage innovation directed at less-polluting production and
treatment processes.3 9 Technology-based standards also discourage abatement
technology innovation by a polluting firm because the innovation will cause
the regulator to mandate its early use in all the firm's plants (including old
ones) requiring the firm to incur more costs sooner than it would otherwise.
To the extent that regulators, such as EPA, often change their standards be-
tween those initially proposed and those finally promulgated, a polluting firm
faces an incentive to slow down the invention and adoption of new abatement
technology because it may not meet the final regulations.
We can think of only one way in which technology-based effluent
standards encourage abatement technology innovation by either polluting or
non-polluting firms. To the extent that a regulatory agency mandates the
wide-spread adoption of a new technology developed by a firm, the agency
creates a widely-expanded market for that firm's innovation. However, given
the inherent difficulty in appropriating the benefits from new abatement
technology4" and the lag between the discovery of a new abatement technol-
ogy and its final promulgation into regulations by a regulatory agency, such
as EPA, it is highly unlikely that this incentive to innovate could dominate the
other disincentives for abatement technology innovation.
Paul B. Downing and Gordon Brady have documented the difficulties
which Dana and Echlin, two manufacturers of NO. automobile retrofit de-
39. A. Myrick Freeman Ill describes this practice and quotes a conclusion of the National
Commission on Water Quality Staff Report stating that in many cases the abatement [technology]
which is actually being installed is equivalent to the suggested technologies, rather than being de-
signed to meet the limitations per se. See Freeman, Air and Water Pollution Policy, in CURRENT Is-
SUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 56 (P. Portnoy ed., 1978).
40. See Noll, supra note 10, at 5-9.
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vices, faced in attempting to meet a market demand for approved retrofit de-
vices created by the California Air Resources Board (CARB).4 ' In 1971 CARB
was empowered to accredit NO,, retrofit devices and to require certificates of
compliance at the initial automobile registration and at the ownership trans-
fer. Dana and Echlin had received CARB approval to market their retrofit
devices in the state program, but by 1974 the program had still not been imple-
mented, so they joined a Clean Air Constituency suit against CARB. 42 Dana
claimed a loss of $9 million in the development and warehousing of its NO.
device, and Echlin claimed a $4.7 million loss. While only one example, this
case illustrates the problems which a firm may encounter in attempting to ap-
propriate the benefits from a new technology developed for approval by an
environmental regulatory agency. In summary,
Conjecture 1: Unless the benefits from the use of new abatement technologies
can be appropriated by their owners and unless regulatory agencies quickly
revise their regulations based on the new abatement technologies, non-
technology-based effluent standards create a stronger incentive for abatement
technology innovation than do technology-based effluent standards.
Even if technology-based effluent standards induce less innovation than do
non-technology-based standards, they are likely to cause faster diffusion
throughout a given industry of those innovations which are produced. This
introduces an important trade-off between faster diffusion of new or existing
innovations and a reduced pool of innovations which will be available for dif-
fusion throughout the industry in the future. The choice between tech-
nology- and non-technology-based effluent standards rests on identifying the
relative strenghts of these two effects in reducing the cost of achieving cleaner
air or cleaner water.
B. Production Technology Innovation
Relative to non-technology-based standards, technology-based standards
discourage output technology innovation because the range of possible new
output technologies is limited by the requirement that they be consistent with
the mandated abatement technology. In addition, the effluent standards may
mandate part of the output technology.
Conjecture 2: Non-technology-based effluent standards create a stronger in-
centive for output technology innovation than do technology-based effluent
standards.
41. Downing and Brady, Implementing the Clean Air Act: A Case Study of Oxidant Control in Los
Angeles, 18 NAT. RES. J. 237, 274 (1978).
42. Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Board, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1974).
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Thus we have argued that technology-based effluent standards are inferior to
non-technology-based standards (which, under the assumptions of Theorem
6, are equivalent to effluent charges and marketable permits) in inducing
both abatement technology and output technology innovation.
VII
SUBSIDIES FOR ABATEMENT CAPITAL
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The effect of granting a subsidy for abatement capital installed by a firm
can be studied by suitable reinterpretation of the output variable in the
Kamien and Schwartz model of factor-augmenting technological progress.
Rather than considering their output variable y to represent the firm's princi-
pal product, we let it stand for the level of pollution abatement or treatment.
To simplify the analysis, we will not consider the trade-off between output
production and effluent abatement that was possible with the formal model
employed in the previous Sections. The two inputs, capital K and labor L,
then are the quantities of inputs which are devoted to pollution abatement. As
in the Kamien and Schwartz model, r and w stand for the unit costs of capital
and labor, respectively.
An abatement capital subsidy lowers the unit cost of capital r, which ini-
tially causes the direction of technical change to shift towards relatively more
labor augmentation and relatively less capital augmentation. 43 However, over
time the capital-labor ratio rises to adjust the reduction in the cost of capital
and at the new equilibrium the direction of technical change has moved back
to its original direction.44 Only in the short run does a capital subsidy bias the
direction of technical advance towards relatively more labor augmentation; in
the long run it has no effect. Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether
the capital subsidy always causes an increase or a decrease in the rate of R&D
spending; therefore, it is impossible to determine how the absolute amount of
capital and labor augmentation change due to the capital subsidy. In sum-
mary,
Theorem 8: An abatement capital subsidy causes an initial rise in the relative
rate of labor versus capital augmentation; however, in the long run the direc-
tion of technical advance is unaffected.4" The effect of these subsidies on the
rate of abatement technology advance is indeterminate.
43. This result follows from Kamien and Schwartz's equation (36), since initially K/L is fixed.
See Kamien and Schwartz, supra note 27, at 676.
44. This result follows from Theorem 5. The equilibrium value for the direction of technical
change is independent of the capital cost. This equilibrium is stable only for an elasticity of substi-
tution less than one, which is not an unreasonable assumption. See Kamien and Schwartz, supra
note 27, at 677.
45. These results are based on the assumptions underlying the Kamien and Schwartz model.
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George E. Peterson and Harvey Galper have predicted that tax losses and
higher interest payments on public debt due to tax-exempt financing of pri-
vate industry's pollution control investment will cost the public almost $1.5 bil-
lion per year (by 1980) while reducing private-industry pollution-control in-
vestment costs by about $550 million annually and transferring the remainder
of the cost to holders of tax exempt bonds.46 Such an expensive program may
well reduce the volume of wastes discharged into the nation's waterways by
industry. However, our results indicate that in the long run, tax-exempt
financing for industrial pollution abatement and rapid anotization of pollu-
tion control equipment will cause substitution of capital for labor and little, if
any, shift in the direction of abatement technology innovation towards those
innovations which are relatively more labor-saving and relatively less capital-
saving.
Perhaps the most well-known subsidies for abatement capital are treatment
plant subsidies given to municipalities, not private firms, Under the 1972
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Certainly we cannot argue that
municipalities invest in R&D for technological advance; however, they do cre-
ate a demand for abatement technology advance which is both capital and la-
bor augmenting. On a macro level, if we think of society as attempting to
minimize the cost of treating a fixed amount of wastes and investing in both
capital and labor augmenting abatement technology advance to reach this
goal, then the results of Theorem 8 can be interpreted to say that in the long
run capital subsidies for municipal waste treatment plants will not affect the
direction of abatement technology advance .1 7
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between non-technology-based standards, charges, and marketable permits,
then in the case of a large number of polluters the model presented in this
paper indicates that all three types of environmental regulation provide ex-
actly the same incentive for both abatement technology and output technology
innovation. If standard, charge, and marketable permit levels are all con-
strained to be constant over time (in which case they are not dynamically
equivalent), then their effects on innovation differ, but, in general, the differ-
ences are too complex to conclude that one policy stimulates more abatement
innovation than another.
Each of the three types of regulation induces a firm to bias its
technological advance towards abatement technology innovation. The regula-
tions can cause a firm to spend either more or less on R&D, depending upon
its production technology and innovation possibilites. If, without any environ-
mental regulation, a firm devotes no R&D effort to abatement improvement,
then imposing either of the three regulations will increase the rate of abate-
ment technology innovation. However, if a firm did invest in improving its
abatement technology without regulation, then the three types of regulation
could decrease (but most likely would increase) the rate of abatement technol-
ogy innovation. Similarly, the three regulatory approaches will most likely de-
crease a firm's rate of output technology innovation, although the effect could
be positive.
A fifth type of environmental regulation, abatement capital subsidies, was
studied to determine whether it would bias technological advance towards rel-
atively more abatement labor augmentation and less abatement capital aug-
mentation. Initially the subsidy does bias innovation towards labor augmenta-
tion. However, over time the firm completely adjusts by raising its ratio of
capital to labor, while the equilibrium direction of technical change settles
back to its original level. In the long run, abatement capital subsidies do not
induce a bias towards relatively more labor augmentation.
These conclusions, even if supported by empirical evidence, do not imply
that society should be indifferent to non-technology-based effluent standards,
effluent charges, and pollution rights markets. There are several other crite-
ria, such as enforceability and administrative ease, on which the choice of en-
vironmental policy could be based. In addition, practical considerations may
require that society choose between policies which are not equivalent over
time. However, the results do indicate that all three policies induce firms to
shift their R&D efforts towards more abatement technology innovation. On
the basis of this single criterion no one policy is more effective than the other
two.
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APPENDIX A: THE MODEL OF PRODUCTION
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
In order to facilitate the separation of the effects of returns to scale from
substitution between output production and effluent reduction, we represent
the production function, g(Ay,Bx), as the composite function
(1) L = 4,(F(Ay,Bx)).
The composite function 4,(F) is homothetic, since the function 4, is assumed to
be an increasing function of the linear homogeneous function f. Formally,
(2) 0'>0, 0">0, 00=0,
so that the marginal product of labor in output production is positive and de-
creases with increased output levels, whereas the marginal product of labor in
effluent abatement is also positive, but increases with the effluent discharge
rate.
Technological progress occurs through expenditures on R&D that produce
changes in the technology coefficients, A and B. Formally,
(4a) A/A = g(,8)h(M),
(4b) B/B =/3 h(M),
where
(5a) h(M)-0, h'(M)>0, h"(M)<0, h'(0) , h(0) = 0,
(5b) /3>0!, g(/8):50, g'(P3)>0 for/3>0, g"(8)>0,
(5c) g'(0) =0, g'3o) -
and/3o satisfies g( 3o)=0.
The curve is analogous to the production-possibilities curve for two conven-
tional outputs which is found in most intermediate microeconomics texts. It
was first suggested by Kennedy in the context of a factor augmentation
model.48 For convenience we assume (5c) that the innovation-possibilities
curve becomes horizontal at the A/A axis and vertical at the B/B axis, al-
though the rate of output technology advance (A/A) could be maximized bv
advances which either improve or worsen the abatement technology (i.e.. the
curve could become horizontal in either the southeast or southwest quadranls
of Figure 1).
Under the assumptions of (5a) an increase in R&D spending, M, shifts out
the entire innovation-possibilities curve, although we do assume decreasing re-
turns to scale in R&D investment, M. The last assumption, that h(0) = (.
means the firm receives no exogenous technological advance, such as froi
the government. This restriction could be relaxed with little effect on the re-
48. Kennedy, Induced Bias in Innovation and the Theory of Distribution. 74 EcoN. .. 541 47
(1964).
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suits of the paper. Also, we refer to M as R&D spending in-house, but it
could be thought of as expenditures on new technology from other firms, al-
though we admit that the market for innovations does not function as
smoothly as most other markets because of the public goods nature of innova-
tions.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Equation (2 0a) in Magat requires that the optimal bias,/3, satisfy
(6) g'(3) - PX
py
where y and x are the profit-maximizing output and effluent rates. When 7
0 then g'()3 ) = 0. Under assumption (5c) (BI/B) - 0 and I A/A reaches its max-
imum value for a given value of M. It is possible that, unlike the example
drawn in Figure 1, the innovation-possibilities frontier flattens out inside the
southeast quadrant; in which case abatement technology could be improving
even without an effluent charge. However, the point is that without a charge
all the R&D effort is devoted to maximizing the rate of output technology im-
provement A/A. By imposing a charge the slope of g'(/3) must be positive (un-
less the pollution rate fell to zero, which Magat shows to be unlikely), so/3
must increase.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Equation (20b) in Magat requires that the optimal rate M of R&D expen-
ditures satisfy
(7) r
h'(M) - /3rx - g(f3 )py,
where r is the firm's discount rate. Without an effluent charge, r/h'(m) -
-g(,3)py. Since under an effluent charge Theorem 1 proved that -g(p3) is smaller
and it can be shown that output is reduced, the second term is reduced. How-
ever, the first term increased from zero to a positive number, thus we cannot
say whether imposing an effluent charge reduces or increases R&D spending.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From (4b) the proportional rate of increase in abatement technology, B/B,
equals the product of the bias in technical advance, /3, and the effective R&D
effort, h(M). If the firm directs no R&D effort to abatement technology im-
provement, then/3 = 0, and B/B = 0. From Theorem 1 the bias increases (/3
becomes positive), so B/B must increase.
[Vol. 43: No. I
Page 4: Winter-Spring 1979] ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 25
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
From (4a) A/A = g(13)h(M), Theorem I proves that imposing an effluent
charge lowers the absolute value of g(p3), but Theorem 2 indicates that R&D
spending could either decrease or increase, so it is possible for the effluent
charge to spur output technology innovation.
